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UNCERTAINTY IN THE EMPLOYMENT
CONTEXT: WHICH TYPES OF
RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS ARE
ENFORCEABLE?
THOMAS M. HOGANt

INTRODUCTION

Restrictive covenants have become a classic condition of
employment, as employers feel the need to protect business
interests.1 Although commonplace, restrictive covenants lead to
an overwhelming amount of litigation over enforcement after the
employment relationship ends. 2 The parties potentially involved
t J.D. Candidate, June 2006, St. John's University School of Law; B.S.,
Industrial & Labor Relations, May 1999, Cornell University.
1 See Phillip J. Closius & Henry M. Schaffer, Involuntary Nonservitude: The
Current JudicialEnforcement of Employee Covenants Not To Compete-A Proposal
for Reform, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 531, 532 (1984) (commenting that restrictive
covenants have "become a standard addition to employment contracts"); Katherine
V.W. Stone, Knowledge at Work: Disputes Over the Ownership of Human Capital in
the Changing Workplace, 34 CONN. L. REV. 721, 723 (2002) (illustrating that "[miore
and more, employers are requiring employees to sign covenants not to compete and
covenants not to disclose confidential information at the outset of an employment
relationship").
2 See Stone, supra note 1, at 738-39 (indicating that a simple online database
search reveals that 3206 federal and state cases were litigated in this area from
1995 through 1999). By performing an identical search for 2000 through 2004, one
would discover that the amount of federal and state cases has increased to over
4500. It is the uncertainty surrounding each party's rights that makes restrictive
covenants a "ripe area of litigation." Kevin Schlosser, Litigation Review: Restrictive
Covenants Remain Ripe Area of Litigation, N.Y. L.J., July 27, 2004, at 15-16; see
also Kathyrn J. Yates, Note, Considerationfor Employee Noncompetition Covenants
in Employments at Will, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 1123, 1123 (revealing that
the"[c]ovenants not to compete have become an increasingly frequent source of
employment litigation"); Dana C.M. Peluso, The Knot Gets a Little Looser, VA. EMP.
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in this type of litigation are the former employer, employee, and
prospective employer. An employer can draft any of the following
three forms of restrictive covenants:
non-competition
agreements, which restrict employees from working for
competitors; 3 non-solicitation agreements, which limit employees
from contacting former clients; 4 or non-disclosure agreements,
which prohibit the disclosure of the former employer's
5
proprietary information to the prospective employer.
The reality that there are no clear rules regarding the
enforceability of restrictive covenants 6 can be frustrating for an
employer that has a vested interest in sustaining its competitive
advantage. 7 On the other hand, the employee can also be placed
in a vulnerable position,8 as he or she may have refused other
employment offers and may not have the benefit of legal counsel
when negotiating the employment contract. Ultimately, the
employee may endure unnecessary trepidation over the
possibility of losing the employment opportunity if the
L. LETTER, June 2002 (remarking that a recent Virginia decision invalidating a noncompete agreement "sent shudders down the spines of employers" because the
restrictive covenant seemed reasonable).
3 See, e.g., Outsource Int'l, Inc. v. Barton, 192 F.3d 662, 664 (7th Cir. 1999);
A.N. Deringer, Inc. v. Strough, 103 F.3d 243, 245 (2d Cir. 1996); Autonation, Inc. v.
O'Brien, 347 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1302 (S.D. Fla. 2004).
4 See, e.g., Benchmark Med. Holdings, Inc. v. Barnes, 328 F. Supp. 2d 1236,
1240 (M.D. Ala. 2004); Latona v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare Inc., 82 F. Supp. 2d 1089,
1091 (C.D. Cal. 1999); Hostetler v. Answerthink, Inc., 599 S.E.2d 271, 273 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2004).
5 See, e.g., Safety-Kleen Sys., Inc. v. Hennkens, 301 F.3d 931, 933-34 (8th Cir.
2002); Johnson Controls, Inc. v. A.P.T. Critical Sys., Inc., 323 F. Supp. 2d 525, 529
(S.D.N.Y. 2004); LCP Holding Co. v. Taylor, 817 N.E.2d 439, 441-42 (Ohio Ct. App.
2004). Employees can violate a non-disclosure agreement simply by accepting
employment under the inevitable disclosure doctrine, which is "[t]he legal theory
that a key employee, once hired by a competitor, cannot avoid misappropriating the
former employer's trade secrets." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 792 (8th ed. 2004).
6 See Greg T. Lembrich, Note, Garden Leave: A Possible Solution to the
Uncertain Enforceability of Restrictive Employment Covenants, 102 COLUM. L. REV.
2291, 2291 (2002) (noting that "court decisions have failed to provide coherent
guidance as to how the enforceability of restrictive covenants is to be determined").
7 See Stone, supra note 1, at 723 (acknowledging that employers believe they
grant valuable skills and knowledge to employees); see also David L. Gregory, Courts
in New York Will Enforce Non-Compete Clauses in Contracts Only If They Are
Carefully Contoured, N.Y. ST. B.J., Oct. 2000, at 27 (observing that businesses are
vulnerable to computer sabotage by employees).
8 See Stone, supra note 1, at 740 (acknowledging that "[hlistorically, courts were
suspicious of noncompete covenants in the employment setting because they
believed they were often the result of vastly unequal bargaining power and thus
contracts of adhesion"); see also infra notes 124-26 and accompanying text.
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agreement, which may have little chance of being enforced, is not
signed. 9 Although the agreement was formed between the
employee and the previous employer, a third party-the
prospective employer-may be introduced to litigation if the
former employer believes the new employer obtained access to
alleged protected interests. Consequently, prospective employers
might be cautious about hiring an individual bound by a
covenant because they do not wish to become engaged in
expensive litigation where priceless proprietary information may
be revealed. 10
In analyzing restrictive covenants in an era of high employee
mobility,1 1 it is sometimes difficult to rationalize the need for
these agreements. This sentiment is reinforced by the notion
that restrictive covenants can be contrary to capitalist principles
of free-market competition, 12 resulting in numerous courts
endorsing invalidation. 13 At the same time, there still exists an
employer's countervailing interest in prohibiting former
9 See Terry R. Boesch, What's Really at Issue in Restrictive Covenant Litigation:
A Commentary Inspired by Staidl, 2 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 439, 439-40 (1998).

Employers present new employees with the "typical troika" of restrictive covenants,
which the employee blindly signs. Id. at 439. The fact that the employer knows the

agreement may be invalidated is irrelevant since "the agreements will have already
served [the ultimate] purpose" of deterring employees from direct competition. Id. at
439-40.
10 See id. at 441-44 (warning that the discovery period may place the new
employer in a precarious position in which the employer must choose between
employing a recently recruited employee or disclosing precious information).
11 See Stone, supra note 1, at 726-27. In the 1990s, blue-collar males
experienced a large decrease in job security. Id. at 727. Additionally, the Bureau of
Labor Statistics reported that "between 1983 and 1998 there was a significant
decline in the percentage of men who [were] with their current employer for ten
years or more." Id. at 726; see also Eleanore R. Godfrey, Inevitable Disclosure of
Trade Secrets: Employee Mobility v. Employer's Rights, 3 J. HIGH TECH. L. 161, 167
(2004) ("Public policy concerns relat[e] to employee mobility and freedom of
employment .... ); William Safire, Essay, The New Disloyalty, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26,
1994, at A17 (saying that the phrase "corporate loyalty" elicits consistent reproach).
12 See Gregory, supra note 7, at 27 (commenting that "absolute constraints
offend principles of freedom of contract, mobility of workers, and the capitalist
political economy favoring vigorous, free competition").
13 See, e.g., Grant v. Carotek, Inc., 737 F.2d 410, 411 (4th Cir. 1984) (recognizing
that 'Virginia law does not look favorably upon restraints"); Fraser v. Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co., 334 F. Supp. 2d 755, 758 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (indicating that these
agreements are not favored); AM Medica Commc'ns Group v. Kilgallen, 261 F. Supp.
2d 258, 262 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (acknowledging that the Second Circuit would rather
not enforce restrictive covenants), aff'd, 90 F. App'x 10 (2d Cir. 2003); Labor Ready,
Inc. v. Abis, 767 A.2d 936, 942 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001) (emphasizing that these
clauses "violate ... public policy").
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employees from exploiting its information or processes. 14
The interests of the three parties create a predictable conflict
in restrictive covenant enforcement. There are many sources
that provide drafting tips for employers, 15 but limited
information is available for employees. Restrictive covenants
have become very common in the employment context, 16 but do
employees really understand the ramifications of what they are
signing, and, furthermore, do they have the option of negotiating
the terms of these agreements? The purpose of this Note is to
bring some understanding as to which types of restrictive
covenants are enforceable. Clarification of this area of the law is
needed as many employers unfairly present these agreements to
employees at the commencement of employment with little or no
guidance. To that end, this Note will review the restrictive
covenant dispute between employers and employees along with
the standards of enforcement in the following manner: Part I
will examine enforceability standards with respect to English
influences and American law. Part II will discuss how the at-will
employment relationship affects restrictive covenants. Part III
addresses the areas where restrictive covenants are most
practical.
Additionally, this Note asserts that employment lawyers
should insist that their clients only use restrictive covenants in
the narrowest of cases and tailored to the most unique of
employees in an effort to limit the amount of litigation in this
area. Too often, employers abuse restrictive covenants to deter
all levels of employees from pursuing opportunities with
competitors. In a time of job insecurity and in a country that
prides itself on the entrepreneurial spirit, it is unfair to limit
employees from pursuing their employment goals unless the
14 See Stone, supra note 1, at 722-23 (recognizing that employees believe skills
acquired on the job belong to them, while employers feel they have a right to protect
their investment in their employees); Nick Akerman & Andrew B. Lachow, Trade
Secrets Law: Use of Written Agreements, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 11, 2000, at B5 (noting that

non-compete agreements serve a purpose in the area of trade secret protection).
15 See, e.g., Lynne Anne Anderson & William R. Horwitz, Restrictive Covenants
After Maw, 176 N.J. L.J. 1033 (2004); Peluso, supra note 2; Properly Structured
Covenants Help When Push Comes to Shove, 14 ENVTL. LABORATORY WASH. REP.,

June 20, 2003; Diane A. Seltzer, Goodbye with Caveats: Restrictive Covenants Work
Best When Written with an Eye to the Future, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 19, 2004, at 47.
16 See Gregory, supra note 7, at 27 ("Employers are more frequently
incorporating these restrictive covenants into written contracts that they insist
prospective employees sign at the commencement of employment.").
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restriction is protecting a bona fide, legitimate interest. '7
I. RESTRICTIVE COVENANT LAW

Restrictive covenants can be traced back to the
apprenticeship system,' 8 where English courts were initially
hostile towards enforcement because these restrictions tended to
disadvantage powerless artisans. 19 This rationale continued
until Mitchel v. Reynolds, 20 in which a baker leased his bakeshop
and promised not to compete for the term of the lease. 21 When
the baker violated the non-competition agreement, the court
ultimately enforced it because the baker agreed to abstain from
competing in return for payment of the lease. 22 Mitchel provided
the framework, which exists today in the American judicial
system, for determining whether a restrictive covenant is
23
reasonable under the circumstances to warrant enforcement.
See infra Part III.A.
18 See Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV.
625, 632-34 (1960) (noticing that in the apprenticeship system, there were cases of
masters unethically restricting apprentices from opportunities to become craftsmen);
see also BDO Seidman v. Hirshberg, 93 N.Y.2d 382, 388, 712 N.E.2d 1220, 1223, 690
N.Y.S.2d 854, 856 (1999) (indicating that "restrictive covenants go back almost 300
years").
19 See Catherine L. Fisk, Working Knowledge: Trade Secrets, Restrictive
Covenants in Employment, and the Rise of Corporate Intellectual Property, 18001920, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 441, 455 (2001) (recognizing that English courts were
particularly unreceptive to restrictive covenants in the apprenticeship system and
that because an artisan could only pursue one trade, the act of restricting this
pursuit was met with disfavor); see also Outsource Int'l, Inc. v. Barton, 192 F.3d 662,
669 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, C.J., dissenting) (highlighting that the English common
law was against enforcement because "workers would be tricked into agreeing to
covenants that would ... propel them into destitution").
20 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (1711).
21 See Blake, supra note 18, at 629 (summarizing the facts in Mitchel, 24 Eng.
Rep. 347).
22 See id.
23 See Fisk, supra note 19, at 456 (revealing that "Mitchel established a
multifactored analysis of reasonableness that has ever since dominated the law's
approach to contractual restraints on the practice of a trade and thus to the
dissemination of workplace knowledge"); see also Blake, supra note 18, at 630-31.
The English court provided a sophisticated analysis to determine the reasonableness
of restrictive covenants by weighing a specific, tailored restraint versus broad,
indefinite restraints. Id. (reviewing the opinion in Mitchel, 24 Eng. Rep. 347); see
also Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Cohen, 173 F.3d 63, 69 (2d Cir. 1999) for a description of
Mitchel.
Since this opinion, courts have been influenced by the reasonableness doctrine in
determining the enforceability of restrictive covenants. See, e.g., Grant v. Carotek,
Inc., 737 F.2d 410, 412 (4th Cir. 1984); Labor Ready, Inc. v. Abis, 767 A.2d 936, 942
17

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:429

Today in the United States, twenty states have drafted statutes
governing the enforceability of restrictive covenants. 24 The
Restatement provides a realistic picture of how some legislatures
and courts analyze restrictive covenants, 25 but it is helpful to
review the statutes and standards to understand why employers
and employees consistently choose to litigate over this issue.
A. State Statutes
This Note will assign the twenty existing state restrictive
covenant statutes to four categories. The first and most common
category, which includes eight statutes (those of Alabama,
California, Michigan, Montana, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
Tennessee, and West Virginia), consists of statutes providing
clear public policy language but offering no guidance to courts on
what will render a restrictive covenant enforceable. 26 The second
category examines statutes providing specific criteria for courts
to utilize when analyzing restrictive covenants and includes four
statutes (those of Florida, Oregon, Texas, and Wisconsin). 27 The
third category analyzes statutes with detailed exceptions to
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001); BDO Seidman, 93 N.Y.2d at 388-89, 712 N.E.2d at 1223,

690 N.Y.S.2d at 856-57.

24 The following twenty states have statutes governing restrictive covenants:
Alabama, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Louisiana, Michigan,
Missouri, Montana, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See BRIAN M.

MALSBERGER, COVENANTS NOT To COMPETE: A STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY (Samuel
M. Brock, III & Arnold H. Pedowitz eds., 4th ed. 2004). Ohio's statute "addresses
contracts and combinations that restrain trade," but Ohio courts do not apply it in
the area of employment non-competes. Id. at 2623; see OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. §
1331.02 (LexisNexis 2002).
25 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 188 (1981). A restrictive covenant
will be found unreasonable if "the restraint is greater than is needed to protect the
promisee's legitimate interest, or... the promisee's need is outweighed by the
hardship to the promisor and the likely injury to the public." Id. § 188(1)(a)-(b).
Under this standard, the employer has the burden of proving that the restriction is
necessary to protect a legitimate interest, and if it is, the following relationships can
be regulated: business seller-buyer, employer-employee, and former partnerpartnership. See id. § 188(2).
26 See ALA. CODE § 8-1-1 (LexisNexis 2002); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 1660016602 (Deering 1992 & Supp. 2005); MICH. COMP. LAws SERV. § 445.772 (LexisNexis
2001); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 28-2-703 to 28-2-705 (2003); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-06
(1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 217-219 (West 1993 & Supp. 2004); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 47-25-101 (2001); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 47-18-3 (LexisNexis 1999).

27 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 542.335 (West 2002); OR. REV. STAT. § 653.295 (2003);
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 15.50-15.52 (Vernon 2002); WIS. STAT. ANN. §
103.465 (West 2002).

2006]

UNCERTAINTY IN EMPLOYMENT

public policy, which allow for broad interpretation and
incorporates five statutes (those of Colorado, Hawaii, Louisiana,

Missouri, and Nevada). 28 The final category reviews three
29
statutes (those of Georgia, North Carolina, and South Dakota)
that seem to favor the enforcement of restrictive covenants.
1. Statutes with Unmistakable Public Policy Language But No
Criteria for Enforcement
California's statute exemplifies the first category as it urges
that "every contract by which anyone is restrained from engaging
in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind is to that
extent void." 30

With this statute, California asserts the policy

that any contract restricting an individual from the opportunity
to earn a living will be considered unenforceable. There are two
statutory exceptions that allow restrictive covenants for sale of
businesses 31 and partnership dissolutions. 32 Alabama, Montana,
North Dakota, and Oklahoma provide similar public policy
33
language and the two exceptions supporting enforcement.
Michigan, 34 Tennessee,3 5 and West Virginia 36 enacted comparable
28 See COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-2-113 (2004); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 480-4
(LexisNexis 2002); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:921 (Supp. 2005); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
431.202 (West Supp. 2004); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 613.200 (LexisNexis Supp.
2003).
29 See GA. CODE ANN. § 13-8-2.1 (Supp. 2005); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-4 (2003);
S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 53-9-11 (2004).
30 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16600.
31 Id. § 16601. Under the sale of business exception, a restrictive covenant will
be enforced where the seller has agreed
with the buyer to refrain from carrying on a similar business within a
specified geographic area in which the business so sold, or that of the
business entity, division, or subsidiary has been carried on, so long as the
buyer, or any person deriving title to the goodwill or ownership interest
from the buyer, carries on a like business therein.
Id.
32 Id. § 16602. The partnership dissolution exception provides that:
(a)Any partner may, upon or in anticipation of any of the circumstances
described in subdivision (b), agree that he or she will not carry on a similar
business within a specified geographic area where the partnership business
has been transacted, so long as any other member of the partnership, or
any person deriving title to the business or its goodwill from any such other
member of the partnership, carries on a like business therein.
Id.
33 See ALA. CODE § 8-1-1 (LexisNexis 2002); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 28-2-703 to
28-2-705 (2003); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-06 (1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 217219 (West 1993 & Supp. 2004).
34 MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 445.772 (LexisNexis 2001).
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legislation, but these statutes are not limited to the employment
context. Michigan leaves the prohibition open ended, as a
restrictive covenant can be deemed void in any "relevant
market."37
Likewise, Tennessee's statute bars restrictive
covenants in "[a]ll arrangements, contracts, agreements, trusts,
or combinations between persons or corporations," 3 while West
Virginia covers, "[e]very contract" or "combination in the form of
39

trust."

2. Statutes Providing Specific Criteria for Enforcement
The second category, those statutes providing standards in
determining enforceability, includes Texas, Wisconsin, Florida,
and Oregon. The first, Texas, actually requires that courts follow
the guidance set forth in its statute. 40 The criteria provide that a
restrictive covenant will be enforced if it is signed as a
supplement or as part of the original agreement; possesses
reasonable limitations in geography, duration, and the scope of
activity; and "[does] not impose a greater restraint than is
necessary to protect" the employer. 41 In addition, this statute
allows courts to modify unreasonable terms rather than
invalidating the entire restrictive covenant. 42
Wisconsin,
although not expressly requiring its courts to utilize its statutory
guidelines, will enforce restrictive covenants "if the restrictions
imposed are reasonably necessary for the protection of the
43
employer."
Florida illustrates the characteristics of the second category
by providing a long list of criteria for enforcement, 44 a non35 TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-101 (2001).
36

W. VA. CODE ANN. § 47-18-3 (LexisNexis 1999).

37 MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 445.772.
38 TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-101.
39

W. VA. CODEANN. § 47-18-3.

TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.52 (Vernon 2002). "The criteria for
enforceability of a covenant not to compete.., and the procedures and remedies in
an action to enforce a covenant not to compete provided by... this code are exclusive
and preempt any other criteria for enforceability of a covenant not to compete ..
40

Id.

41
42

Id. § 15.50(a).
Id. § 15.51(c).

43 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 103.465 (West 2002).
44 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 542.335 (West 2002). In summary, the elements for
enforcement include: (1) an agreement "set forth in a writing signed by the person

against whom enforcement is sought"; (2) the protection of a "legitimate business
interest"; (3) a restriction reasonable in "time, area, and line of business." Id.
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exhaustive record of what is considered a "legitimate business
interest,"45 and guidelines for reasonable temporal limits. 46 Even
with these extensive parameters, critics believe the statute still
leads to unpredictable results, particularly because the
determination of a legitimate business interest must be resolved
on a case-by-case basis.4 7 Lastly, Oregon provides requirements
for enforcement 48 and also mentions trade secrets but does not
49
offer concrete examples.
3. Statutes with Unmistakable Public Policy Language and
Additional Exceptions
The third category, those statutes with public policy concerns
and detailed exceptions to barring enforcement of restrictive
covenants, includes Louisiana, Hawaii, Missouri, Colorado, and
Nevada. The opening section of Louisiana's statute is similar to
its counterparts in the first category 50 but then indicates that
restrictive covenants less than two years in duration may be
formed with employees and independent contractors. 51 Similarly,
Hawaii follows its public policy assertion with an exception for
trade secrets. 52
Lastly, Missouri exempts trade secrets,
confidential information, and client contacts 53 but leaves the

45 Id.
§ 542.335(1)(b). Legitimate business interests include "[tirade
secrets,... [v]aluable confidential business or professional information that
otherwise does not qualify as trade secrets ....[s]ubstantial relationships with
specific prospective or existing customers, patients, or clients .... [c]ustomer,
patient, or client goodwill, [and] ...[e]xtraordinary or specialized training." Id.
46 See id. § 542.335(1)(d)-(e). Temporal limits differ depending on whether the
subject is a former employee, former distributor, or seller. Id.
47 See E. John Wagner, Striking a Balance?: The Florida Legislature Adopts an
Unfair Competition Approach to Restrictive Covenants, 49 FLA. L. REV. 81, 110
(1997) (declaring that the uncertainty over determinations of an employer's
legitimate business interest "will prevent [the act] from providing the predictable
results its drafters sought to achieve").
48 See OR. REV. STAT. § 653.295 (2003). "(1) A noncompetition agreement ... is
void and shall not be enforced by any court in this state unless the agreement is
entered into upon the: (a) [i]nitial employment of the employee with the employer; or
(b) [s]ubsequent bona fide advancement of the employee with the employer." Id.

49 Id. § 653.295(5).

50 See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:921 (Supp. 2005). The introductory section to
this statute is very similar to California's and also includes the sale of business and
partnership exceptions. Id. § 23:921(B)-(C).
51 Id.
§ 23:921(C).
52 HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 480-4 (LexisNexis 2002).
53 Mo. ANN. STAT. § 431.202 (West Supp. 2005).
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interpretation and standards to the courts. 54
The other statutes within the third category, Colorado5 5 and
Nevada, 56 provide strong language prohibiting employers from
preventing an employee's pursuit of an occupation but list
several exceptions that seem to weaken the bite of the state's
policy. For instance, Colorado's statute opens with "any covenant
not to compete which restricts the right of any person to receive
compensation for performance of skilled or unskilled labor for
any employer shall be void" 57 but then allows for enforcement
where the covenant protects trade secrets, employee training of
58
less than two years, and executive management positions.
Similarly, Nevada imposes strict penalties for restricting
employees 59 but does not prohibit non-compete agreements that
restrain employees from "pursuing a similar vocation in
competition with" the former employer or non-disclosure
agreements protecting trade secrets. 60 Although initially these
statutes seem to benefit the employee, the exceptions, in an
attempt to provide impartial language, leave a lot of discretion to
the courts.
4. Statutes Favoring Enforcement
The final category presents three statutes that seem to
support enforcement of restrictive covenants.
First, South
Dakota allows non-competition and non-solicitation agreements
for periods of less than two years. 61 Unlike other statutes,
enforcement may simply depend on whether the employee signed
the agreement. 62 Similarly, North Carolina enforces restrictive
covenants as long as they are in writing and signed by the
54 See, e.g., Safety-Kleen Sys., Inc. v. Hennkens, 301 F.3d 931, 937 (8th Cir.
2002)
(indicating
that
"[t]he
Missouri
courts
have
frequently
held
that.., substantial and individualized customer contacts are a protectable
interest").
55 COLO.REV. STAT. § 8-2-113 (2004).
56 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 613.200 (LexisNexis Supp. 2003).
57 COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-2-113(2).
58 Id. § 8-2-113(2)(b)-(d).

59 See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 613.200(1). In Nevada, an employer that restricts
an employee from gaining employment will be "guilty of a gross misdemeanor and
shall be punished by a fine of not more than $5,000." Id.
60 Id. § 613.200(4)(a)-(b).
61 See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 53-9-11 (2004).
62 See id. The language states, "[a]n employee may agree with an employer at
the time of employment" to execute a non-competition or non-solicitation agreement.
Id. (emphasis added).
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employee.63

Georgia enacted one of the more detailed statutes concerning
restrictive covenants. 64
This statute explicitly states that
reasonable restrictive covenants are compatible with public
policy notions.6 5 Reasonable durational limits vary between two
and three years depending on the restricted activity.6 6 The
statute also provides that an employer only has to predict in good
faith which post-employment activities need to be restricted at
the time of termination. 67
Ultimately, a broad restrictive
covenant can be narrowly tailored to the specific opportunity the
terminated employee is pursuing. Furthermore, similar to the
law in Texas, Georgia courts are directed to modify partial
68
restraints of trade by severing any unreasonable terms.
B. Conflicts Between State Restrictive Covenant Laws
In a time of employee mobility, 69 it is common for employees
to travel interstate to acquire new positions, which frequently
creates conflict among state laws.70 Under section 187 of the
Restatement of Conflict of Laws, although parties may include
forum selection clauses, courts may view such provisions as being
contrary to state public policies. 7 1 Furthermore, a court will
disregard the parties' agreed choice of law in two cases: (1)
63 See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4 (West 2003). North Carolina allows
enforcement when the "agreement is in writing duly signed by the party who agrees
not to enter into any such business within such territory." Id. (emphasis added).
6 See GA. CODE ANN. § 13-8-2.1 (Supp. 2005).
65 Id. § 13-8-2.1(a). "Contracts that restrain in a reasonable manner... are
contracts in partial restraint of trade and shall not be considered against the policy
of the law, and such partial restraints, so long as otherwise lawful, shall be
enforceable for all purposes." Id.
66 See id. § 13-8-2.1(c)(2)-(6). The following time limits apply: two years or less
for competitive activities and three years or less for soliciting former clients or
recruiting other employees. Id.
67 Id. § 13-8-2.1(e)(2). "The post-employment covenant shall be construed
ultimately to cover only so much of such estimate as relates to the activities actually
conducted, the products and services actually offered, or the areas actually involved
within a stated period of time prior to termination." Id.
6 Id. § 13-8-2.1(g)(2)(3).
69 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
70 See Mark A. Kahn, Trade Secret: Non-Compete Agreements: CaliforniaLaw:
Application Group, Inc. v. Hunter Group, Inc., 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 283, 283
(1999) (commenting that each state has its own rules for restrictive covenants, and
judgments will sometimes supersede the laws of one state in a situation where the
standards clash).
71 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(b) (1989).

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:429

where the chosen state does not possess a "substantial
relationship to the parties" or (2) where the agreed law would be
72
contrary to the state law most related to the transaction.
The first exception, as opposed to the second exception, is
somewhat straightforward due to guidance under section 188 of
the Restatement. This section provides five contacts to be
considered in determining a substantial state relationship: "(a)
the place of contracting, (b) the place of negotiation of the
contract, (c) the place of performance, (d) the location of the
subject matter of the contract, and (e) the domicil, residence,
nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the
parties." 73 The second exception is not as clear, and therefore
warrants further review. For example, in Application Group,
Inc., v. Hunter Group, Inc.,7 4 the employee signed a non-compete
agreement in Maryland but later resigned and acquired a new
position with a competitor in California. 75 Due to the companies'
differing principal places of business, a choice of law conflict
arose based on Maryland's flexibility in enforcing restrictive
covenants 76 as compared to California's strong public policy
72 Id.

§ 187(2)(a)-(b). The relevant portion of the Restatement concerning

exceptions to the parties' choice of law specifies:

(2) The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual
rights and duties will be applied, even if the particular issue is one which
the parties could not have resolved by an explicit provision in their
agreement directed to that issue, unless either
(a) the chosen state has no substantial relationship to the parties or
the transaction and there is no other reasonable basis for the parties'
choice, or
(b) application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary to a
fundamental policy of a state which has a materially greater interest
than the chosen state in the determination of the particular issue
and. . . would be the state of the applicable law in the absence of an
effective choice of law by the parties.
Id.
73 Id. § 188(2) (1971). Several courts have adopted this standard to determine a
state law's relation to the restrictive covenant. See, e.g., Budget Rent A Car Corp. v.
G & M Truck Rental, No. 03C2434, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11323, at *14-15 (N.D.
Ill. June 26, 2003), vacated as moot, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24009 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 21,
2003); Standard Register Co. v. Cleaver, 30 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1092 (N.D. Ind. 1998).
74 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 73 (Ct. App. 1998).
75 Id. at 76.
76 See Ancora Capital & Mgmt. Group v. Gray, 55 Fed. App'x 111, 112 (4th Cir.
2003) (granting a preliminary injunction to the employer in order to prohibit the
former employee from continuing to work for a competitor); Kahn, supra note 70, at
291-92 (revealing that restrictive covenants are generally held to be valid under
Maryland law, though there are restrictions placed on the employer's ability to
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against enforcement. 77 Ultimately, the court applied California
law, finding that California would face greater injury if its laws
7
were subordinated to Maryland's.
This decision may have its opponents, 79 but other courts
have followed the same reasoning. For example, Massachusetts
courts typically respect the parties' choice of law unless a
different state has a "materially greater interest" in determining
enforceability. 0 Alabama is more stringent as it refuses to apply
a different state's law if the restrictive covenant is unenforceable
under Alabama law.81 Likewise, Georgia simply will not apply a
state law that may be harmful to Georgia's interests concerning
82
restrictive covenants.
C. State Court Standards
It is encouraged that the parties in an employment
relationship understand how states without statutes governing
restrictive covenants evaluate such agreements.8 3 Typically, the
enforce them).
77 See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (Deering 1992 & Supp. 2005); see also
Latona v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 82 F. Supp. 2d 1089, 1093 (C.D. Cal. 1999);
D'Sa v. Playhut, Inc., 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 495, 498 (Ct. App. 2000); Muggill v. Reuben
H. Donnelley Corp., 398 P.2d 147, 149 (1965); Chiara F. Orsini, Protecting an
Employer's Human Capital: Covenants Not to Compete and the Changing Business
Environment, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 175, 192 (2000) (revealing that choice of law
provisions are typically not recognized when facing California's restrictive covenant
law).
78 Application Group, Inc. v. Hunter Group, Inc., 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 73, 86 (Ct.
App. 1998). The Court of Appeal of California read the second exception of the
Restatement as an authorization to ignore a choice of law provision in exchange for
the preservation of the state's public policy. Applying this reasoning, the court was
"convinced that California ha[d] a materially greater interest than ... Maryland in
the application of its law to the parties' dispute, and that California's interests
would be more seriously impaired if its policy were subordinated to the policy of
Maryland." Id.
79 See Kahn, supra note 70, at 289 (describing the court's decision to apply
California over Maryland law as a "fundamental error").
80 See Oxford Global Res., Inc. v. Guerriero, No. 03-12078-DPW, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 23503, at *13 (D. Mass. Dec. 30, 2003) ("In general, Massachusetts respects
contractual choice of law provisions.").
81 See Benchmark Med. Holdings, Inc. v. Barnes, 328 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1242
(M.D. Ala. 2004) ("Alabama courts ... will not apply another state's law if the
covenant not to compete is void under Alabama law.").
82 See Keener v. Convergys Corp., 342 F.3d 1264, 1269 (11th Cir. 2003)
("[Georgia] will apply its own law to any agreements against its public policy .... ).
83 This section presents a sampling of state standards in order to illustrate some
of the differences in restrictive covenant standards. For a more comprehensive study
concerning state restrictive covenant standards, see MALSBERGER, supra note 24.
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first hurdle in enforcing restrictive covenants is based on the
reasonableness of the geographical and temporal limits in light of
the employment
circumstances.8 4
The second hurdle
traditionally reviews whether the employer possesses a
85
legitimate reason for restricting the employee.
1. First Hurdle: Reasonable Geographic and Durational Limits
Courts have different standards for what is considered a
reasonable geographic boundary for the regulated activity. One
instructive case defined a proper geographic limit as one that is
"well-defined and no greater than what is required to protect the
employer's business or goodwill."8 6 The determination of what
constitutes a proper geographic limit varies, but there are
conventional guidelines.
First, if there are no explicit geographical limits, courts have
7
typically found the entire restrictive covenant unenforceable
unless they have chosen to modify the covenant using the blue84 See, e.g., Liautaud v. Liautaud, 221 F.3d 981, 985 (7th Cir. 2000)
(emphasizing that "[t]o be enforceable,... the agreement must be reasonable in
time, in geographical scope, and in the activities restricted"); Ticor Title Ins. Co. v.
Cohen, 173 F.3d 63, 70 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting the enforceability of a restrictive
covenant will be based on whether it is "reasonable in time and geographic scope"
and depends on "the facts of each case"); see also D.O.T. Tiedown & Lifting Equip.,
Inc. v. Wright, 272 A.D.2d 290, 290-91, 707 N.Y.S.2d 893, 894 (2d Dep't 2000)
(holding that a restrictive covenant with geographical and durational limits was not
unreasonable or a product of overreaching).
85 See, e.g., Outsource Int'l, Inc. v. Barton, 192 F.3d 662, 666 (7th Cir. 1999)
(applying the state standard to determine if "[the] employer ha[d] a legitimate
business interest to justify enforcement of a covenant"); Fraser v. Nationwide Mut.
Ins. Co., 334 F. Supp. 2d 755, 758 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (recognizing that "[a] necessary
prerequisite .. . is the existence of a protectible business interest"); Rockford Mfg.,
Ltd. v. Bennet, 296 F. Supp. 2d 681, 686 (D.S.C. 2003) (reasoning that one of the
factors to balance is whether the restrictive covenant "is necessary for the protection
of the legitimate interest of the employer"); BDO Seidman v. Hirshberg, 93 N.Y.2d
382, 388, 712 N.E.2d 1220, 1223, 690 N.Y.S.2d 854, 856-57 (1999) (holding that a
covenant should be enforced to the extent that it is "no greaterthan is required for
the protection of the legitimate interest of the employer").
86 Labor Ready, Inc. v. Abis, 767 A.2d 936, 943 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001); see
also Hebb v. Stump, Harvey & Cook, Inc., 334 A.2d 563, 569 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1975) (noting that "a covenant not to compete, which is over-broad as to area, will
not be enforced").
87 See Liautaud, 221 F.3d at 987 (applying Illinois law and concluding that
restricting a sandwich-shop owner from opening a store anywhere outside of the city
of Madison, Wisconsin was unreasonable and overbroad because no other
geographical limits existed in the restrictive covenant); Int'l Paper Co. v. Brooks, 63
Va. Cir. 494, 496-97 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2003) (finding that an agreement cannot have
open-ended geographic and durational limits).
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pencil method to retain the reasonable portions.8 8 Second, courts
have found restrictive covenants with geographical limits
covering one state or less to be reasonable.8 9 Lastly, courts have
also tolerated restrictive covenants that are conditioned on the
employer's regional client base. 90 Under this qualification, the
employee could conceivably be banned from soliciting clients
throughout the country, .thus leading to unpredictable results in
enforcement. 91
As opposed to the various approaches used with geographic
boundaries, courts are more consistent with temporal limits.
Similar to limitless geographical restraints, provisions drafted
92
without expiration will render a restrictive covenant invalid.
The common threshold courts follow for durational purposes is
93
two years or less.
2. Second Hurdle: "Legitimate" Interest
Under

the

second hurdle,

the

determination

of what

88 See Seach v. Richards, Dieterle & Co., 439 N.E.2d 208, 215 (Ind. Ct. App.
1982) (applying the blue-pencil doctrine to enforce the restrictive covenant "to the

extent of its legally acceptable terms"). But see LCP Holding Co. v. Taylor, 817
N.E.2d 439, 446 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004) ("Although a trial court may modify an
unreasonable restrictive covenant to make it reasonable and enforceable, it is not
required to do so.").
89 See Safety-Kleen Sys., Inc. v. Hennkens, 301 F.3d 931, 934, 937 (8th Cir.
2002) (upholding a restrictive covenant limiting employee within Missouri without
utilizing the state statute); Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Cohen, 173 F.3d 63, 66, 73 (2d Cir.
1999) (enforcing a restrictive covenant that prohibited a title insurance salesman
from competing in the state of New York); see also A.N. Deringer, Inc. v. Strough,
103 F.3d 243, 244-45, 249 (2d Cir. 1996) (applying Vermont law to allow a
restrictive covenant that covered a one-hundred-mile radius); Stiepleman Coverage
Corp. v. Raifman, 258 A.D.2d 515, 515-16, 685 N.Y.S.2d 283, 284-85 (2d Dep't 1999)
(finding a fifty-mile radius reasonable).
90 See Rockford Mfg., Ltd. v. Bennet, 296 F. Supp. 2d 681, 689-90 (D.S.C. 2003)
(allowing that restrictions from contacting customers may be used as a substitute);
see also Medtronic, Inc. v. Gibbons, 684 F.2d 565, 566 (8th Cir. 1982) (permitting the
employer to limit an employee from contacting existing customers).
91 See Am. Fid. Assurance Corp. v. Leonard, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1120-21 (D.
Kan. 2000) (modifying a geographical limitation of existing clients to strictly the
employee's former sales territory of nine counties); see also Seach, 439 N.E.2d at 215
(restricting the employee from soliciting present clients). But see LCP Holding Co.,
817 N.E.2d at 446-47 (refusing to modify an agreement with limitless boundaries).
92 See, e.g., Liautaud, 221 F.3d at 987 (finding the lack of a "temporal
restriction" to be unfair to the defendant).
93 See, e.g., Rockford Mfg., Ltd., 296 F. Supp. 2d at 689 (highlighting that two
years is reasonable as "[c]ovenants of comparable duration have been regularly
upheld"); Am. Fid. Assurance Corp., 81 F. Supp. 2d at 1120; Stiepleman Coverage
Corp., 258 A.D.2d at 515, 685 N.Y.S.2d at 284.
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constitutes an employer's legitimate interest involves a thorough
analysis by courts. The degree of authenticity of the business
interest will influence a court's judgment on the reasonableness
of the geographic and durational limits. In Illinois, courts allow
employers to protect different types of interests: (1) customer
relationships that exist solely due to the employee's connection to
the employer and (2) confidential information obtained from the
employer and utilized by the employee post-termination. 94 In
order to determine the first type, Illinois courts choose between
two tests, consisting of either a standard that balances seven
factors relating to the history, quality, and extent of the client
contact 95 or a test that inquires whether the business in question
warrants protection. 96 Illinois courts typically use the latter
standard, referred to as "the nature of the business test," to
review whether the employer's product is specialized and if the
97
company's success is dependent on long-term customer loyalty.
If the company cannot easily be tested by this method, a court
can utilize the seven-factor test, but it is not mandatory that they
do so. 98 The second area, protection of confidential information,
94 See Outsource Int'l, Inc. v. Barton, 192 F.3d 662, 666 (7th Cir. 1999). Illinois
courts recognize two situations that will justify enforcement of a restrictive
covenant: "(1) where the customer relationships are near-permanent and but for the
employee's association with the employer the employee would not have had contact
with the customers; and (2) where the former employee acquired trade
secrets.., and subsequently tried to use it for his own benefit." Id.; see also
Lawrence & Allen, Inc. v. Cambridge Human Res. Group, Inc., 685 N.E.2d 434, 443
(Ill. App. Ct. 1997).
95 See Agrimerica, Inc. v. Mathes, 557 N.E.2d 357, 363 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990). The
seven objective factors are:
(1) the number of years required to develop the clientele; (2) the amount of
money invested to acquire clients; (3) the degree of difficulty in acquiring
clients; (4) the extent of personal contact by the employee; (5) the extent of
the employer's knowledge of its clients; (6) the duration of the customers'
association with the employer; and (7) the continuity of employer-customer
relationships.
Id.
96 See Outsource Int'l, Inc., 192 F.3d at 667 (reviewing the nature of the
business test which determines if the employer has a legitimate interest).
97 Id. The Seventh Circuit opined that "certain businesses are... more
amenable to success under it." Id. (quoting Lawrence & Allen, Inc., 685 N.E.2d at
444). For example, a company involved in professional services, where revenues are
contingent on long-term relationships, will more likely have a legitimate reason for
protecting business interests as opposed to a company focusing on sales, where there
is a consistent turnover of clients. Id.
98 See Springfield Rare Coin Galleries, Inc. v. Mileham, 620 N.E.2d 479, 490 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1993). The trial court determined that the restrictive covenant was not
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is satisfied through two steps. First, the employer must prove
that the employee accessed this information while employed and
then tried to utilize it after termination. 99 Second, regardless of
whether this is accurate, the employer must demonstrate that
the confidential information is worth protecting through the
means of a restrictive covenant.10 0 Similar to Illinois, Minnesota
courts stipulate that the second step is only achieved if the
restrictive covenant "protect[s] a legitimate interest of the
employer." 101
Much like the approach outlined in the Restatement, New
York applies a three-prong reasonableness standard that finds a
restrictive covenant enforceable "only if it (1) is no greater than is
required for the protection of the legitimate interest of the
employer, (2) does not impose undue hardship on the employee,
and (3) is not injurious to the public." 10 2 Under the first factor, a
legitimate interest may include customer relationships, 10 3 unique
services,' 0 4 or confidential customer information. 10 5 Similar to
enforceable because the type of business-rare coins and metals-fell under the
sales category and, therefore, did not involve the type of client relationship that
should be protected. The employer, on appeal, argued that the seven-factor test
should have been applied, but the court concluded this was unnecessary because the
particular business fell "squarely within one of the two categories ...[the] court
ha[d] previously recognized." Id.
99 See id. at 485.
100 See Outsource Int'l, Inc., 192 F.3d at 669 (finding the employer had
legitimate trade secrets based on its effort in "maintain[ing] classified records on its
customers"); see also Springfield Rare Coin Galleries, Inc., 620 N.E.2d at 485
(reminding that "customer lists and other customer information will constitute
confidential information only when the information has been developed by the
employer over a number of years at great expense and kept under tight security").
101 Medtronic, Inc. v. Gibbons, 684 F.2d 565, 568 (8th Cir. 1982) (including trade
secrets and confidential information within the parameters of a legitimate interest).
102 BDO Seidman v. Hirshberg, 93 N.Y.2d 382, 388-89, 712 N.E.2d 1220, 1223,
690 N.Y.S.2d 854, 856-57 (1999) (emphasis omitted).
103 See id. at 392, 712 N.E.2d at 1225, 690 N.Y.S.2d at 859. The Court of
Appeals determined that existing customer relationships were fundamental to the
operation of the employer's accounting business and therefore, were a legitimate
interest of the firm. Id.; see also Rockford Mfg., Ltd. v. Bennet, 296 F. Supp. 2d 681,
686 (D.S.C. 2003). The South Carolina courts agree with this rationale and recognize
that a company's customer base is the most important asset to the business. Id. But
see Colonize.com, Inc. v. Perlow, No. 03-CV-466, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20021, at *12
(N.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2003) ("Customer lists are generally not considered confidential
information.").
104 See Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Cohen, 173 F.3d 63, 70 (2d Cir. 1999). The Second
Circuit reasoned that "[s]ervices that are not simply of value to the employer, but
that may also truly be said to be. . . unique" may fall under this category. Id.
105See Columbia Ribbon & Carbon Mfg. Co. v. A-1-A Corp., 42 N.Y.2d 496, 499,
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the analysis employed in Illinois, the second factor in New York
recognizes that all or none of these areas may be protected
depending on the extent to which the restrictive covenant places
an undue hardship on the employee. For example, in BDO
Seidman v. Hirshberg,106 the New York Court of Appeals found
that protecting existing client relationships of an accounting firm
was a legitimate interest, whereas developing prospective clients
within the accounting industry was not. 10 7 Lastly, under the
third factor, the New York standard slightly deviates from that of
Illinois by taking into account the public's interest in whether to
enforce a particular restrictive covenant. 108 For example, New
York courts will consider principles of good faith and fair dealing
prior to enforcement. 109

Virginia and Maryland courts promote standards similar to
those used in New York, as the restraint is balanced between the
positions of the employer, employee, and the public. 110 In Grant
369 N.E.2d 4, 6, 398 N.Y.S.2d 1004, 1006 (1977). As long as the alleged confidential
information is not "readily ascertainable from sources outside [the] business," it may
be considered information that warrants protection. Id.
106 93 N.Y.2d 382, 712 N.E.2d 1220, 690 N.Y.S.2d 854 (1999).
107 Id. at 392, 712 N.E.2d at 1225, 690 N.Y.S.2d at 859. "Extending the anticompetitive covenant to BDO's clients with whom a relationship with defendant did
not develop through assignments to perform direct, substantive accounting services
would" overburden the employee. Id.; cf. Merrell Benco Agency, Inc. v. Safrin, 231
A.D.2d 614, 615, 647 N.Y.S.2d 952, 953 (2d Dep't 1996). Confidential customer
information may be considered a legitimate business interest, but it must be proven
that the employee used the information to his or her benefit. Id.
108 See BDO Seidman, 93 N.Y.2d at 394, 712 N.E.2d at 1226, 690 N.Y.S.2d at
860-61.
109 Id. "[I]f the employer demonstrates an absence of overreaching, coercive use
of dominant bargaining power, or other anti-competitive misconduct, but has in good
faith sought to protect a legitimate business interest, consistent with reasonable
standards of fair dealing, partial enforcement may be justified." Id.
110 For Virginia's approach, see Grant v. Carotek, Inc., 737 F.2d 410, 412 (4th
Cir. 1984). The Fourth Circuit noted:
Virginia courts have applied a three-prong test:
(1) Is the restraint, from the standpoint of the employer, reasonable in the
sense that it is no greater than is necessary to protect the employer in some
legitimate business interests?; (2) From the standpoint of the employee, is
the restraint reasonable in the sense that it is not unduly harsh and
oppressive in curtailing his legitimate efforts to earn a livelihood?; (3) Is
the restraint reasonable from the standpoint of a sound public policy?
Id.; see also Alston Studios, Inc. v. Gress & Assocs., 492 F.2d 279, 282-83 (4th Cir.
1974). For the standard used in Maryland, see Labor Ready, Inc. v. Abis, 767 A.2d
936, 942 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001). The test applied consisted of:
(1) whether restraint is necessary for the protection of the business or
goodwill of the employer, (2) whether it imposes upon the employee any
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v. Carotek, Inc.,"1 the Fourth Circuit applied Virginia law to
determine that a restrictive covenant limiting an employee from
competing for five years was too great an imposition on the
employee and the public. 112 In Labor Ready, Inc. v. Abis,1 13 the
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland reviewed a non-compete
that prohibited a former employee from "operat[ing]" for one year
in the temporary-worker recruiting industry within a ten-mile
radius from the employer's office. 1 14 Although the non-compete
covenant may seem reasonable at first glance, in light of the
earlier discussion as to geographical limitations, 115 the court
remanded the case in order to determine the meaning of
"operate," because if this term was interpreted broadly, it would
11 6
be an extensive restriction and injurious in the public's eyes.

II. THE EFFECT OF AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT ON RESTRICTIVE
COVENANTS

A. Maw v. Advanced Clinical Communications, Inc.: Can an
Employee Be Terminatedfor Refusing to Sign a Non-Compete
Provision?
In Maw v. Advanced Clinical Communications, Inc.,1 1 7 the
plaintiff, Ms. Karol Maw, was fired for refusing to sign a
restrictive covenant containing non-compete, non-solicitation,
and non-disclosure provisions that was presented to her three
years after the commencement of employment.1 18 Ms. Maw did
greater restraint than is reasonably necessary to secure the employer's
business or goodwill, and (3) whether the degree of injury to the public is
such loss of the service and skill of the employee as to warrant
nonenforcement of the covenant.

Id.
111
112

737 F.2d 410 (4th Cir. 1984).

Id. at 411-12.

113

767 A.2d 936 (2001).

114

Id. at 938-39.

115 See supra Part I.C.1.
116 See Labor Ready, Inc., 767 A.2d at 944-47. The employer failed to specify
what was included under the term "operate." If interpreted broadly, and to the
employer's favor, the employee could not contact any potential customers within the
defined radius. Rather than construing the language against the drafter concerning
this ambiguous language, which is typical in contract disputes, the court postponed
its decision to wait "[u]ntil the parameters of the non-compete provision [were]
known.... Id. at 945-46.
117

846 A.2d 604 (N.J. 2004).

118

Maw v. Advanced Clinical Commc'ns, Inc., 820 A.2d 105, 110 (N.J. Super. Ct.
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not object to the disclosure and solicitation portions, but disputed
the non-compete provision because she felt it would restrict her
from future employment opportunities. 119
Similar to other
states, 120 New Jersey courts weigh the interests of the employee
versus the employer with due consideration for the public's
"concern in fostering competition, creativity, and ingenuity." 121
The court found for the employer, reasoning that Ms. Maw could
dispute the non-competition provision when the employer
attempted to enforce it.122
In Maw, essentially, the court decided that an employee's
one channel for disputing a restrictive covenant was in response
1 23
to the employer's attempt at enforcement through legal means.
Although the court reasoned that the burden of enforcement was
on the employer, this Note asserts that the opinion failed to
recognize that the employee would be placed in an unfavorable
economic and legal position.1 24 Although the Maw decision is
persuasive, not all states agree with its line of reasoning. For
example, contrary to Maw, California case law has suggested
that an employee cannot be fired for the failure to sign a
restrictive covenant because the employee does not have equal
bargaining power for negotiation when faced with an impending
termination. 125 Regardless, the Maw decision brought a "sigh of
relief' to employers and may have far-reaching implications in
26
encouraging the use of restrictive covenants.
App. Div. 2003), rev'd, 846 A.2d 604, 607 (N.J. 2004).
119Id. at 111.
120 See supra notes 101, 109-10 and accompanying text.
121Maw, 846 A.2d at 609; see also Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Ciavatta, 542 A.2d 879,
887-88 (N.J. 1988); Solari Indus. Inc. v. Malady, 264 A.2d 53, 56 (N.J. 1970).
122 See Maw, 846 A.2d at 609.

See id.
From an economic position, an employee will probably possess inferior legal
resources as compared to the employer in preparing for litigation. Furthermore,
rather than negotiating with the employer initially over the terms of the noncompete clause, the employee will have to hope that the employer does not seek
enforcement, thereby placing herself in an adverse legal position.
125 See D'Sa v. Playhut, Inc., 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 495, 501 (Ct. App. 2000)
(objecting to "the concept that a worker, compelled by economic necessity to secure
employment, can be thus coerced into signing [a restrictive covenant] in the
uninformed hope the agreement will not be enforced by the courts"); see also Latona
v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 82 F. Supp. 2d 1089, 1097 (C.D. Cal. 1999).
126 See Anderson & Horwitz supra note 15 (commenting that "[ilt
is clear that
Maw reaffirms the continued viability of reasonable restrictive covenants"); Thomas
A. Muccifori, No Maw Uncertainty, 176 N.J. L.J 811 (2004) (emphasizing that "the
decision will not only restore certainty to employers who seek to legitimately protect
123
124
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B. Do Restrictive Covenants Persevere When the Employee Was
Fired?
The termination of an employee bound by a restrictive
in determining
covenant will probably be considered
In situations where an employer is properly
enforceability.
exercising at-will termination, state courts apply one of three
approaches. 127 The first method, employed solely by New York,
considers enforcement where the employee was terminated for
cause 128 but invalidates covenants applied against employees
terminated without cause. 29 The second approach, followed in a
majority of states, places a heavier burden of persuasion on the
employer for enforcement after termination than would be
The last
required if the employee had instead resigned.' 30
approach, utilized only by Florida, refuses to factor the
involuntary termination into its review of the restrictive
3
covenant's enforceability.' '
C. Is the Expectation of Continued Employment Adequate
Consideration?
One of the basic arguments supporting the enforcement of
restrictive covenants is that the employee receives sufficient
consideration in exchange for the promise not to compete, solicit
business interests through the use of restrictive covenants but will also reassure
their counsel who draft, negotiate and litigate such covenants").
"You're Fired! And Don't Forget Your Non127 See Kenneth J. Vanko,
Compete..." The Enforceability of Restrictive Covenants in Involuntary Discharge
Cases, 1 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 1, 9 (2002); see also Stone, supra note 1, at 73943 (analyzing the various approaches and rationales courts have taken towards noncompete agreements in the at-will employment context).
128 See Vanko, supra note 127, at 10; see also Gismondi, Paglia, Sherling, M.D.,
P.C. v. Franco, 104 F. Supp. 2d 223, 232-33, (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (analyzing a restrictive
covenant where the employee was terminated for misappropriation of the employer's
funds).
129 See Post v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 48 N.Y.2d 84, 89,
397 N.E.2d 358, 361, 421 N.Y.S.2d 847, 849 (1979) (finding the covenant invalid per
se due to a termination without cause).
130 See Vanko, supra note 127, at 9, 11. Under this approach, the court
presumes that the restrictive covenant is invalid, unless the employer can
demonstrate that enforcement is a necessary protection. See id.; see also SafetyKleen Sys., Inc. v. Hennkens, 301 F.3d 931, 934, 936-937 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding
that employee-customer contacts are a protectable interest warranting enforcement
of a covenant not to compete).
131 See Vanko, supra note 127, at 9 (indicating that the final approach is
"decidedly pro-employer and holds that a court cannot consider an involuntary
termination").
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former clients or employees, or disclose information. 132 The main
debate in this area is whether the promise of continued
consideration. 133
sufficient
constitutes
employment
1 34 nor state
Unfortunately, neither the Restatement of Contracts
135
statutes provide much guidance to help clarify this issue.
Furthermore, unlike other variables surrounding enforcement
where state courts may support one another, this is an area
where courts disagree. 136 As this determination is left to the
court's discretion, an employer looking to relieve uncertainty
should offer separate consideration in exchange for the
employee's agreement to enter into a restrictive covenant.

132 See Blake, supra note 18, at 629-31 (discussing the importance of
consideration in the "early cases"). Consideration was evident in Mitchel v. Reynolds,
discussed above, where the baker leased his business and agreed not to compete
with the lessee. Id. at 629.
133 See Yates, supra note 2, at 1124 (discussing "whether the consideration given
by the employer for a noncompetition covenant is illusory because of the employer's
unrestricted right to terminate employment unilaterally at any time even without
cause").
134 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 (1981) (failing to provide
any assistance on whether consideration separate from employment is necessary).
135 Of the twenty state statutes that govern restrictive covenant enforcement,
only two mention consideration. In Oregon, a non-compete that is entered into after
the start of employment will not be enforced, unless the employer provides
additional consideration. OR. REV. STAT. § 653.295(1)(b) (2003). In Georgia,
consideration is mentioned in two areas. First, there must be consideration in the
sale of a controlling interest. GA. CODE ANN. § 13-8-2.1(b)(1)(D), (G) (2001). Second,
where a portion of the restraint needs to be clarified, no additional consideration is
necessary. Id. § 13-8-2.1(f)(3).
136 Some states view continued employment as sufficient consideration. See, e.g.,
Affiliated Paper Cos. v. Hughes, 667 F. Supp. 1436, 1448-49 (N.D. Ala. 1987)
("[T]his
Court
is
thoroughly
persuaded
that... [the
employment

contract,] ...

terminable

at

the

will of either

party,

does

not... require

a

determination... that the noncompetition clause.., was unreasonable."); McRand,
Inc. v. Van Beelen, 486 N.E.2d 1306, 1313-14 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985); Computer Sales
Int'l, Inc. v. Collins, 723 S.W.2d 450, 452 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); Hogan v. Bergen
Brunswig Corp., 378 A.2d 1164, 1167 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977). Other states,
however, require additional consideration. See, e.g., Freeman v. Duluth Clinic, Ltd.,
334 N.W.2d 626, 630 (Minn. 1983); Kadis v. Britt, 29 S.E.2d 543, 548-49 (N.C.
1944); McCombs v. McClelland, 354 P.2d 311, 315 (Or. 1960); George W. Kistler, Inc.
v. O'Brien, 347 A.2d 311, 316 (Pa. 1975).
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III. AREAS WHERE RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS HAVE AN INCREASED
CHANCE OF ENFORCEMENT

A. "Legitimate" Trade Secrets
Employers usually invoke the inevitable disclosure doctrine
to protect trade secrets and allege that an employee has violated
a non-disclosure agreement
simply by accepting new
employment. 137
As one esteemed scholar indicated, it is
understandable that employers wish to safeguard their interests
in such a technologically advanced workplace. 138 But what
constitutes a trade secret? As discussed earlier, both legislatures
and courts have struggled in their attempt to determine what
falls under this label.139
The Restatement of Torts points out that trade secrets "may
consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of
information which is used in one's business, and which gives [a
person] an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors
who do not know or use it;"140 this model was later approved as a
national standard. 4 1 Unfortunately, the determination of what
falls under this definition is complicated because of the
perpetually changing nature of the business world. 142
Consequently, courts are left to balance, on a case-by case basis,
the extent to which competitors and the general public are
familiar with the information against the irreparable harm to the
137 See supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing the theory and effect of
the inevitable disclosure doctrine).
138 See Gregory, supra note 7, at 27. Businesses have good reason to feel
vulnerable, as confidential information can be easily transferred out of the
workplace. See id. (discussing the effect of an increase in "high-tech, computer-based
knowledge workers" on company security given the fact that so much company
information can "be placed on a single computer disc").
139 See supra Parts I.A, I.C.2 (demonstrating the debate as to the requirements
governing restrictive-covenant law).
140 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939).
141 See Godfrey, supra note 11, at 163 (indicating that the Restatement's
definition served as a model for state trade secrets law until its adoption by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law under the Uniform
Trade Secrets Act); see also Brandy L. Treadway, An Overview of Individual States'
Application of Inevitable Disclosure:Concrete Doctrine or Equitable Tool?, 55 SMU L.
REV. 621, 626 (2002) (stating that the "[Uniform Trade Secrets Act] was designed to
clarify definitions, set statutes of limitations and codify case law for remedies").
142 See Godfrey, supra note 11, at 163 n.15 (indicating that the Restatement
provides a non-exhaustive record of potential trade secrets due to the difficulty in
scripting a proper definition).
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company were the information disclosed. 143 Under this approach,
the trade secret must be genuinely unique; 144 thus, information
that is considered readily available to the public will not be
protected. 145

B. Nature of the ContractualRelationship
There are two additional conditions that support an
argument for enforcement. The first circumstance, where a
seller, lessor, or departing partner signs a restrictive covenant,
induces minimal debate concerning the document's enforcement
146
for two reasons: (1) statutory exceptions allow for enforcement
147
and (2) courts are willing to favor enforcement in this area.
143 For example, a recent Second Circuit opinion weighed the following factors to
ascertain whether trade secrets existed:
(1) the extent to which the information is known outside of the business; (2)
the extent to which it is known by employees and others involved in the
business; (3) the extent of measures taken by the business to guard the
secrecy of the information; (4) the value of the information to the business
and its competitors; (5) the amount of effort or money expended by the
business in developing the information; and (6) the ease or difficulty with
which the information could be properly acquired or duplicated by others.
Johnson Controls, Inc. v. A.P.T. Critical Sys., Inc., 323 F. Supp. 2d 525, 537
(S.D.N.Y. 2004).
144 See SI Handling Sys., Inc. v. Heisley, 753 F.2d 1244, 1263 (3d Cir. 1985)
(finding the methods concerning the robotic system at issue to be trade secrets as the
product was the first of its kind).
145 See Colonize.com, Inc. v. Perlow, No. 03-CV-466, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
20021, at *12-13 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2003) (finding that customer information is not
confidential when it can be "acquired by anyone desiring it"); Chiswick, Inc. v.
Constas, No. 2004-00311, 2004 Mass. Super. LEXIS 272, at *8-9 (Mass. Super. Ct.
June 17, 2004) (commenting that information was not confidential "where the
employer openly shares information among its employees"); JAD Corp. of Am. v.
Lewis, 305 A.D.2d 545, 546, 759 N.Y.S.2d 388, 388 (2d Dep't 2003) (concluding "that
the information the plaintiff sought to protect [was] readily available from publiclyavailable sources"); see also Gregory, supra note 7, at 34 (claiming "[a]bsent evidence
of actual misappropriation by an employee, restrictive covenants should be enforced
in only the rarest of cases"); Stone, supra note 1, at 763 (advocating that "courts
should adopt a narrow definition of trade secrets, limit enforcement of noncompete
covenants to the protection of trade secrets narrowly defined, [and] reject the
doctrine of inevitable disclosure").
146 See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16601-16602 (Deering 1992 & Supp.
2005); MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-703 (2003); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-06 (2002);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 218-219 (West 2002).
147 See, e.g., Group Concepts, Inc. v. Barberino, No. CV030286221, 2004 Conn.
Super. LEXIS 1036, at *17-18 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 16, 2004) (awarding a
preliminary injunction to the purchasers of a real estate company to restrict the
former owner from competing); Boulanger v. Dunkin' Donuts Inc., 815 N.E.2d 572,
578 (Mass. 2004) (finding a non-compete limiting a donut-chain franchisee
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The second argument for enforcement is where the employee's
learned skills are so specialized that the employer will inevitably
The
suffer severe harm when the employee leaves.1 48
determination of what constitutes a special service hinges on the
employment relationship-specifically, the extent to which the
company depends on the employee's talents and the ability of the
149
employer to staff the position after the employee leaves.
Although restrictive covenants in these areas have an increased
chance of enforceability, it is important to use reasonable
temporal and geographic restrictions in order to avoid judgments
150
that modify or invalidate the agreements.
CONCLUSION

With such a vast amount of state law to digest in
comprehending the limits of restrictive covenants, it is
understandable that employers and employees may become
respective
rights.
their
in
deciphering
disillusioned
Unfortunately, there probably is not much else legislatures or
judges can propose to clarify this issue. Furthermore, it is
unlikely that the United States Supreme Court will supply a
common standard because each state has its own justifications
Laws
for enforcing or invalidating restrictive covenants.
governing restrictive covenants have originated from state policy,
thus leading to inconsistencies in what states feel is crucial in
determining enforcement. Additionally, the concept of legitimate
business interests is a moving target as a result of an everchanging technological world.
A possible improvement would be for state standards to
place more emphasis on the education of both parties. In order
for an employer to elicit favor from the courts, restrictive
covenants have to be tailored to the specific activity, possess
reasonable limits, and protect only those interests that are
indeed legitimate and undisclosed. Anything more restrictive is
not worth an attorney's fees for drafting, as boilerplate restrictive
enforceable).
148 See Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Cohen, 173 F.3d 63, 70 (2d Cir. 1999) (indicating
that services that are "special, unique or extraordinary" might influence a court to
enforce a covenant restricting these activities, but only if the employer can show
injury).
149

Id.

See supra Part I.C.1 (discussing the role of geographic and temporal
limitations on the enforcement of restrictive covenants).
150
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covenants are not looked upon favorably.151
Additionally, it is strongly recommended that employees
seek legal counsel prior to signing restrictive covenants. In light
of recent case law, it may not be a prudent idea to refuse to sign,
but rather to recognize fully the ramifications of the covenant
and evaluate whether the position is worth relinquishing certain
future opportunities in return for imminent employment.
Furthermore, after receiving an offer and prior to exhausting
other employment opportunities, it is advised that an employee
inquire about the employer's policy concerning restrictive
covenants as a condition of initial employment or later in the
employment relationship.
This may alleviate some of the
inequity in the respective parties' bargaining positions when an
employee is confronted with a restrictive covenant at either the
commencement of or during employment. Although these are
some of the many suggestions for improvement, employers and
employees should heed the advice of outside counsel prior to
forming a contractual relationship because our court dockets
cannot endure much more litigation in this area. 152

151 See Gregory, supra note 7, at 27-28 (opining that courts "have not been welldisposed to boilerplate covenants").
152 See Stone, supra note 1, at 723 (citing that these disputes are becoming one
of the most "frequently litigated issues in the employment law field").

